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•THE INCIDENCE OF XAR[ET-STABILIZING PRJCE SUPPORT SCHEMES 
Brian D. Wriaht and Jeffrey C. William, 
Yale University and Brandeis University 
Prominent among government interventions into aartets for aaricultural 
and other primary products are various programs for supportina producer 
prices. Many of these schemes, that for dairy products in the United States 
for example, have a fairly obvious price-raising rationale. Here we 
consider the implications of schemes, such as measures for supporting arain 
prices, that might be defended as market-stabilizing in that their support 
levels are below the mean price. Even if market participants are risk 
neutral. such scheme• can significantly affect their welfare. 
One such scheme involves deficiency payments which the government pays 
producers as the difference, if podtive, between a target price. and the 
market price. Another is a floor price scheme of the simplest type, in 
which the government, or an association of producers. makes an open offer to 
buy or. subject to availability of public stocks. to sell the commodity at a 
'floor price.' Floor price schemes are more colDJllOn in practice than 
deficiency payments. They are also more complex interventions, directly 
affecting both production and private storage. 
Schemes involving price floors tend to follow a familiar pattern, 
Producers complain of a large quantity 'overhanging' the market and of the 
low incomes that result. The government responds by purchasing the surplus 
and raising the current price, with the intention of selling later when the 
aarket is stronaer. Yet. after only a few years have aone by. producers 
aaain articulate the complaint, confirmed by impartial observers. that their 
incomes have fallen despite the program. Pressure 1110unts for a higher 
support level, the sequence then repeating itself. 
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This apparent failure of most price floor schemes, which has important 
political consequences, is sometimes attributed to secular decline in the 
terms of trade for primary commodities. Another cause lies in the 
differences between the initial effects and comparative statics effects of 
the schemes. Acquisitions for the stockpile boost producers' revenues in the 
early years of a scheme. But after it has been in operation for a long 
time, average revenue for producers may well be lower than if no scheme 
existed. The present value of the income path can be positive even if the 
long-run effect on producers• income is negative. Whenever the present 
value of the income path is positive, producers will rationally support 
floor schemes, al though they will repeatedly argue for a higher floor, 'in 
order to benefit from the boost provided by the additional accumulation of 
government stocks. 
Thus, dynamic effects determine who benefits, and by how much, from the 
program's introduction. The crucial inter-period connections, forged by 
storage and responsive supply, determine the initial effects of a commodity 
program and the subsequent evolution to the new stochastic steady state. 
Unfortunately, the dynamic effects can be deduced only from nu.me rical so­
lution of a model of a commodity market. On the other hand, comparative 
statics effects can be assessed analytically, and perhaps that explains why 
they have been the focus of most previous studies of market stabilization 
(e.J. Newbery and Stiglitz 1981 and references therein). But they do not 
adequately indicate the incidence effects that are the subject of this paper. 
We begin in Section 1 with an outline of a model with a simple price 
support scheme. Then we discuss in Section 2 the implications of a price 
support scheme in the steady state, assuming it stabilizes consuption. Jn 
Section 3 we consider the dynamic evolution of the mod~l after a policy 
change, and this discussion leads to an assessment of the incidence effects 
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of price supports in Section 4, includinJ the contrast with coaparative 
statics results. In Sections Sand 6 we consider the implications of 
responsive supply and risk aversion, and conclusions follow in Section 7. 
1. A Market Model with a Random Disturbance and Private Storage 
Under a scheme either of deficiency payments or of a price floor, 
government intervention in any low-price period is price-stabilizing for 
producers, in the sense that it aoves current producer price toward the mean 
of its post-stabilization distribution. When making deficiency payments, 
the government pays producers the difference, if positive, between a 'target 
price' PT and the market price Pt paid by consumers in period t. So under 
this scheme, producer price Pt• is 
(1) 
Under a floor price scheme, the government ensures that the producer price, 
which is also the market price, does not fall below the floor price~: 
(2) 
FThe floor price is defended by an open offer to purchase any amount at P 
In a so-called 'price band' scheme, resale of stocks 10 acquired may be 
triagered at a price above~- Here we consider only the simpler case in 
which the 1overDJDent stands ready to buy or sell (subject to its having a 
sufficient quantity in store) any amount at PF. Both the taraet price PT 
and the floor price~ are assumed to be below the free-market mean. 
From producers' perspective, less simplistic 1over11J11ent rules may be 
superior, But the prevalence of relatively simple or arbitrary rule, 
implies that aovernments find it difficult to identify and implement more 
complex alternatives. Indeed Wright and Williams (1982b) ahow that the 
conventional stochastic dynamic progra111JDing strateay for investigating such 
policies encounters a problem of the type identified by lydland and Prescott 
(1977): the 'state variable' is a function of private storage and 
production, which in turn depend upon expectations of future public storage 
behavior. 
Apart from the presence of public storage and deficiency payments or 
pdce floors, the market model sketched in the next several paragraphs 
follows that developed for undistorted private storage in Wriaht and 
Williams (1982a). For the incidence of support schemes, three 
characteristics of the model are particularly important: the degree of 
curvature in the demand curve, the supply elasticity, and the nature of the 
random market disturbance. 
Ye specify the stationary inverse consumption demand for the commodity 
in each period as 
(3) pt = a + bqt
1-C 
, aP/aq < o 
where Pt is the market price in year t and qt is the quantity consumed. 
Income is assumed constant for consumers throughout, so the income term is 
~uppressed in (3). This form includes the linear (a> 0, b< 0, C = 0) and 
constant elasticity (a~ 0, b > 0, C > 1) specifications. The relative 
curvative of the demand curve is constant in (3), and is aeasured by C = 
Ye consider two alternate assumptions regarding the market di,turbance. 
One is that production ht is subject to a disturbance proportional to 
• • 
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the amount of the planned harvest h, which must be chosen in period t-1. 
The short-run (within-period) supply response is assumed to be zero. 
2 
The 
supply function is therefore 
(4) 
where the disturbance vt is drawn from a distribution which is serially 
uncorrelated, with mean of zero and finite variance, and P; is the 
marginal incentive as of period t-1. Assuming all atomistic producers share 
this multiplicative disturbance, under rational expectations (see Wright 
(1979)) Pr is 
t 
( 5) = BEt-1CPtht] = Et-1 [Ptht] 
B'nt Ii.t 
where Et-l denotes the expectation operator given the information available 
in period t~l. Atomistic profit-maximizing producers individually view 
price as exogenous to their production decisions, but recognize that their 
own production disturbance will affect price because it is shared by others. 
P~ is a function not only of the mean but also of higher moments of the 
distribution of the disturbance Vt in (4) above. 
The alternate assumption is that the stochastic disturbance shifts 
market demand. We attribute the shift in market demand observed by 
producers in the region or country of interest to what is in fact the most 
usu.al cause, namely random fluctuation in excess demand from other regions 
or countries, reflecting production disturbances therein. Since excess 
demand ia assumed to be unresponsive to incentives, perhaps because of price 
controls in the foreign market, these fluctuations are exoaenous to the 
model. The supply function is in this case 
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( 6) + w 
t 
where wt is i.i.d. with mean zero and finite variance. (With such an 
additive disturbance, P; equals expected price.) 
If the disturbance is fixed ,at zero. production and cons1111ption is q, 
N 
price is~. revenue is RN, and storage equals zero. Otherwise, the 
quantities produced, consUJDed, and stored satisfy the following 
market-clearing condition: 
(7) 
where St-l 2_ 0 is total storage from period t-1 to period t, comprising 
private storage, s;. and government storage, s:. and At is the amount 
available in period t, the commodity when previously stored being 
indistinguishable from new production, 
Competitive private storage, if strictly positive, equates current 
consumption price Pt to the return from the next period, net of marginal 
storage costs kt, assumed constant, and interest costs at rater> 0. Thus, 
for private storage the familiar complementary inequalities bold: 
0 > (1 
(8) 0 = (1 
These conditions implicitly determine the amount of private storage as a 
function of the amount available and the floor price, 
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(9) 
The aovernment's behavior is determined by its commitment to buy or sell any 
aaount. subject to the availability of stocks. at the floor price. Thus, 
Sc-_ F F(10) s't = llu[At - t q • OJ, s: I (At, PF) 
F F F 1-Cwhere q is amount consumed at the price floor, P s: a + b (q ) • 
In examining the incidence of public price supports, we assume that the 
market is initially in a stochastic steady state. Upon the simultaneous 
announcement and introduction of the price support scheme, asswned 
permanent, the market suffers an initial perturbation, then follows a path 
that converges to the new steady state, as shown in the example in Figure 1. 
The initial steady state revenue is the random variable R At period 0,- ss 
when realized revenue of producers. who are assumed to own all of the large 
available supply. would be I. the introduction of a floor price scheme 
. 0 
Fshifts the revenue realization to R. Conditional on the information set 
0 
0 availa~le at period 0, the path of expected revenue years in the future 
0 
is aiven by E(R/ Q, PF) which converges to mean revenue in the new steady
0 
state.,!. In the next three sections we shall consider, first, the
IS 
effect of price supports on current flows in the steady state, then the 
nature of the dynamic path, and fin•lly the full incidence effects of the 
schemes on individuals. 
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2. Multi-Period Comparative Statics 
Obviously, under a deficiency payment scheme, financed in a lump-sum 
fashion. storage is not directly affected by the tar1et price. Any effect 
is induced indirectly, via the production response. Therefore, the first 
proposition is: 
Proposition 1: If. supply elasticity ia zero, a deficiency payments sche111e 
with lump-sum financing affects only producer income. 
The effects of a floor price scheme are more interestina. In the 
stochastic steady state mean consumption equals mean production. Then .~s 
long as supply elasticity is zero the scheme does not alter mean 
If the floorconslimption, regardless of the existence of private storage. 
is in general consumption-stabilizing, then the change in consumption is a 
mean-preserving reduction in its dispersion,_ the opposite of a 
mean-preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970). This implies the 
following proposition regarding price: 
Proposition 2: If the consumer demand curve is stationary, and linear or 
convex in the range of possible consumption, and supply elasticity is zero, 
a floor price scheme cannot raise mean price in the steady state. 
For the demand specification (3) above, Pis convex (concave) in q as C > 
(0 O. For the linear specification (C = 0), mean price is unaffected by a 
floor price, while for the constant elasticty specification (C = (1 - 1/~D) 
) 1) a reduction in the dispersion of quantity consumed reduces aean price. 
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Of course revenue, not price, matters to producer,. The effect of a 
price floor on mean revenue or on mean consumer expenditure, Pq i, also 
sensitive to the demand specification. From (3), 
(11) a2 (Pq)/aq2 = (2 - C)(l - C) bq-c = (2 - C)aP/aq 
Proposition 3a: When supply is perfectly inelastic, and the disturbance is 
in production, the comparative statics effect of a floor price scheme on 
mean consumer expenditures is positive (negative) as C h less (greater) 
than 2. 
Thus, in the linear case for example, mean revenue always increases with the 
floor price. but for the case of constant elasticity, mean expenditure 
decreases (increases) if demand is price inelastic (elastic). These 
expenditures go both to producers and to private storers, but the latter, by 
our assumption of competition along with constant mar1inal and average 
storage costs, make zero profits on average. 
Proposition 3b: When the disturbance is in production, and supply 
elasticity is zero, the comparative statics effect of a floor price scheme 
on mean producer revenue is of the same sign as (2 - C - l(ASc)) where ASc 
is the expected steady state chan1e in private storaae, 1(0) = 0, and 
as:ta<Asc> > o. 
The fllllction I reflects storage coats and can be determined numerically. 3 
But what if local producers face a random disturbance in market demand, as 
in (6) above? Then, if the local producers have fixed, nonstochastic 
production, the effect on their expected revenue is 
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proportional to the effect on expected price in Proposition 2. 
Proposition 4: Producers have a comparative statics loss of expected 
revenue from the stabilization of an exogenous additive disturbance to 
aarket demand if C > O. 
Bow do consumers fare under consumption-stabilizing price supports? 
The steady-state effects on the rerresentative consumer, under zero supply 
elasticity, depend on the convexity or concavity of the indirect utility 
function V(P,Y). The following proposition is proved in Wright and Williams 
(1984a, p. 171): 
Proposition S: The comparative statics effect on consumer welfare of 
stabilization of consumption, under zero supply elasticity, bas the sign of 
the coefficient of relative commodity risk aversion with respect to quantity 
cons11J11edr at the (variable) market price, defined as: 
(12) 
where l is the budget share, ~y is the income elasticity of demand, and Py 
is the Pratt-Arrow coefficient of relative risk aversion with respect to Y. 
What are the implications of introducing positive finite supply 
response? For producers, positive supply response mitigates but does not 
reverse the distributive bias of a floor price scheme, reported in 
Propositions 2 through 4. Similar findings were derived for 'ideal 
production stabilization' in 1riaht (1979), and for the comparative statics 
effects of profit-aaximizing private storaae in Wright and Williams (1982a). 
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However, with a multiplicative supply disturbance (4) the increa,e in 
steady state supply at low valuu of C, due to the respon,e of pr, (S), 
■eans that consUJDers can now Jain fro■ stabilization over a wider range of C 
than indicated in Proposition 5. But at hiaher values of C, or with an 
additive disturbance (6_). aean production and consumption are decreased. 
reducing any conswner Jain from areater coDsaaption stability. 4 
When supply elasticity is positive, deficiency payments increase mean 
consumption and production but restrict the complementary interactions of 
private storage and production described in Yriaht and Williams (1982a). 
Bence they reduce the stabilizing role of storage, and destabilize 
consumption and price. How do floor price schemes affect aovernment 
expenditures? Until recently it was standard practice to assume no private 
storage at all when examining the prospects for public buffer stock schemes. 
(Exceptions are Helmberger and Weaver (1977), Sharples (1980), Gardner 
(19?9) and Wright and Williams (1982b).) If private storage is ignored, the 
government may possibly run a storage scheme at a profit. But it seems more 
reasonable to assUJDe expected- profit-maximizing 5 competitive6 private 
storage whether or not the government intervenes. Under these conditions 
the private market will compete away any expected profits if the government 
has no cost advantage, while the private sector will avoid expected losses. 
Thus, we have: 
Proposition 6: If expected-profit-maximizing competitive private storers 
exist, the aovermient, except in the limiting case of breaking even, suffers 
an expected revenue loss from any floor price scheme. 
These analytical propositions have all been checked by extensive 
numerical analysis. To solve the stochastic dynamic progrUUDing problem for 
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the private storage rules under deficiency payments and price floors, 
denoted by functions r°(A • PT) and fF(A , PF), and to calculate welfare 
t t 
effects, we use a aethod siailar to that described in Wright and Williams 
(1984a} aodified to take account of the support aeasures. 
Ye assume parameters rouahly consistent with those of U.S. arain 
■arkets. The consuaption 4eaan4 elasticity is -0.2 at the nonstochastic 
equil ibriua and the budget share is very s11al 1. justifying use of expected 
consumer surplus as an approximation to ex apte compensating variation 
(Wright and Williams 1984c). The disturbance has a SJ11Ubetric 
7 five point 
distribution expressed in terms of mean production of -15', -7.S~. 0.OCli, 
+7.S~. and +15.M with probabilities 0.0S, 0.20, 0.S0, 0.20, and 0.05 
respectively. Xarginal storage costs, whether public or private, are 2.S~ 
of pN, and the interest rate is S~. The results of simulations (7500 
periods) of this aodel wue used to approximate the steady state effects of 
price supports. They uniformly confirm the analytical propositions of this 
section, 11UDJ11arized in Table 1. 
3. The Dynamic Evolution of Producer Income 
The effect on revenue of a floor price scheme can diverge greatly from 
the long-run steady state effect for many periods after its introduction. 
This is obvious from Figure 1, which was aenerated using the nu,erical 
■ethods discussed above. Therefore, to assess the incidence of a scheme, it 
is necessary to 10 beyond the coaparative statics results of the previous 
section and consider explicitly the dynamic evolution of the effects of the 
scheme. The expected time path of producer revenue as of the introduction 
of a support price equal to 90.. of the price pN, less the path expected 
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without the price support, is shown in Fi1ure 2 for two levels of initial 
availability. The base.case (panel 2a) is the cue ahown in Figure l. 
Demand has constant price elasticity. curvature parameter C equals 6.0, 
supply elasticity ia zero, and the disturbance ia located in production. 
The other five cases show the relative importance of T&riations in 
specification. 
In each panel of Figure 2, the sequence denoted by dots represents the 
case in which a large amount of the commodity, 12°'9 of qN, is initially 
available. (Presumably, a support scheme would be aore likely to be 
introduced if current price were -unusually low.) Producers are assumed to 
own all initial availability. (If they do not, their &•ins in period O are 
overstated.) Subsequently, the luck of the sequence of draws of the random 
disturbance determines the precise path and whether, ex post, the scheme has 
raised or lowered income in any given period. Several periods into the 
scheme, by chance the course of the random disturbance may have been such 
that the price support scheme benefited producers every period so far. With 
another sequence, the buildup of public stocks may have been so areat over 
the course of several periods that when a saall harvest occurred. one that 
with the smaller stocks accumulated without a floor would have raised price 
substantially, price remained low, and as a result income was much lower 
than it would have otherwise been. The discrete sequences in Figure 2 
present the avera1e of 10,000 of these paths, each followed for eleven 
periods from the introduction of the scheme. 
All the dotted sequences in Figure 2, beginning from a larae initial 
availability, show the price floor eventually becoming, on averaae, a less 
effective income support as tiae aoes by. This decay in effectiveness of 
income support holds also for deficiency payments (panel 2f) when the 
initial availability is lar1e, in which cue it represents converaence 
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towards the comparative statics differential discussed above. But in 
contrast to the case of price floors, the decline is monotonic. 
The paths of a ■ all squares in Fiaure 2 indicate cases in whicb tbe 
initial conditions were low availability (9()11 of qN) and hi&h price. In 
these cases the announcement of the floor price scheme antedates the initial 
aquiaitions of aovernment stocks. With a price floor, the path of the 
differential in revenue rises initially, because expected net acquisitions 
for the government stock are positive for a number of periods after the time 
of introduction. (Because initial availability is 10 low, it is likely that 
the first acquisitions will not occur until several periods have elapsed.) 
The expected path eventually turns downward, to converge on the steady state 
differential~ which is negative under a price floor if C exceeds 2-K. In 
the case of a deficiency payments scheme introduced when the market is 
tight, the expected revenue path increases monotonically to the steady state 
level. 
4. The Incidence of Price Supports 
The steady state results for producer surplus, and the dynamic paths, 
help us to understand how price supports change the path of income flows in 
a co111111odity aarket. But the change in current income in any period does not 
indicate the incidence on current producers. Upon the (unanticipated) 
implementation of a permanent support scheme at tiae t 0 , the value of Jand
8 
and the price of the co111J11odity will adjust i-ediately to new dynamic 
equilibrium levels, assuming full Ricardian capitalization. 9 Assuming risk 
neutrality, the change in land value is the expected present value at t of 
0 
the change in the income flow from land, from the time of the next harvest, 
t1, to infinity. Any expected net aains or losses from the program accrue 
to those OWlliaa, at t , land or the commodity. Their 
0 
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change in wealth equals the chanae in land value plus the chanae in the 
value of initial stocks. 
The near-term boost in demand associated with accuaulation of public 
stocks may be sufficient to raise producers' wealth, asa1lllliDJ they own the 
land at the time of introduction of the scheme. even if the long-run effect 
on income is negative. Quite aiaply, the initial boost occurs because the 
government must buy before it can sell, and it is important because the 
long-run steady state is heavily discounted. 
A convenient summary of the distributive effects of various price 
floors and deficiency payments on producers and consumers is presented by 
surplus transformation curves. such as those in Figure 3. Gardner (1983) 
and Josling (1974) use similar curves to show the comparative static effects 
on current surplus flows of price-raising schemes in the context of a 
deterministic market (where stabilization cannot be an issue). In Figure 3, 
the origin represents the initial free market situation. Consumer and 
landholder benefits are measured by the expected present value of consumer 
surplus and producer surplus respectively, expressed as a percentage of RN, 
the product of pN and qN defined above. Here it is assumed that the scheme 
is financed with a lump-sum tax on producers. Thus, the curves indicate 
whether an association of risk-neutral producers, rather than the 
aovern.ment, would find it advantageous to initiate a floor price scheme or 
make deficiency payments. 
For the case of zero supply elasticity and constant elasticity of 
de■ and. the surplus transformation curve OA in Fiaure 3 shows the effects of 
introducin& various levels of price floors in a year in whicht 0 
availability A0 is 120lfa of qN, so that there will be a large carryover in 
storaae. Selected price floors are marked on OA, as fractions of~-
Unlike the surplus transformation curves for price supports in a 
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deterministic model, which raise ■ean producer price (Gardner 1983), the 
curve OA is non-concave. For floors up to 85, of PN, producers lose while 
there is a net transfer to consumers present and future. For biaher floors 
the schemes are much less favorable to cons1111ers. At the 9c,ir. level, for 
example. the scheme reduces wealth of current producers and the welfare of 
present and future consumers. But if price is 9S, of PN. current producers 
have a clear gain in wealth from the scheme while consumers lose. 
The difference in the desirability of various floors can be explained 
as follows. The current effect of an early purchase at the floor price is to 
increase current producer surplus and reduce current consumer surplus. 
Subsequent resale reduces. that period's producer surplus and increases 
consumer surplus. and these current effects, at high values of c. dominate 
in magnitude the initial requisition effects. Yhen the price floor is 80% 
of pN, the effect of the scheme is to increase total stocks in periods of 
surplus, but this increment is typically resold fairly quickly. once the 
market price rises above the floor. as illustrated in panel b of Figure 2. 
The expected duration of holding is sufficiently small that the net effect 
is an increase in the present value of consumer surplus, and a fall in the 
value of land plus stocks held at the time of introduction of the scheme~ 
When the price floor is closer to the free market mean, as in panel a of 
Figure 2, buffer stock additions are ■ore frequent, and releases occur more 
rarely. in the early periods. Thus. the expected holding period of an early 
■arainal incre ■ent is of sufficiently greater duration that the initial 
welfare effects dominate, so that the scheme favors producers at the expense 
of consumers. 
The vertical distance to the surplus transformation curve. from the 
diaaonal OC, the locus of fully efficient transfer. aeasures the total 
dead-weiaht loss of a scheme. A slope of 1reater than -1.0 indicates a 
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marginal dead-weight loss from an increase in the price support. Deficiency 
payments when supply is perfectly inelastic have no dead-wei&bt loss. The 
transfer to producers equals the cost of the scheme, so with producer 
financing the relevant transformation curve collapses to the oriain O. On 
the other hand, price floors can have a substantial dead-weight Joas for 
high floors, approaching 40-. of bud1etary expenditures on average and 65~ 
. 10 a t the margin. 
The dead-weight loss from a price floor supported through public 
storage arises precisely because 1tora1e is socially excessive. Too 11YUch is 
held in store and for too long, on average. Much of the budgetary expense, 
which might otherwise go to producers, is wasted through excessive physical 
storage and interest costs. 
Given the wastefulness of storage expenses in a floor price scheme, 
destruction upon acquisition at the price floor, or other extra-market 
disposal such as foreign aid, of some part of the supply might be a superior 
policy. In the constant elasticity demand specjfication with zero supply 
elasticity it is easy to show that in a c.omparative statics analysis the 
response of producer surplus (PS) and consumer surplus (CS) to marsinal 
destruction of output is 
(13) d(PS)/d(CS) = -(2-C)/(1-C) 
which, in the example with C=6, equals -0.8. In Figure 3, the curve OE, 
aenerated numerically, shows the tradeoff for A0 equal to 120I, of qN. Its 
slope. which is very close to -0.8, is steeper than that of OA. The 
deadweight.loss is less than half of that of a price floor. The excess 
costs of storage are, of course, far less obvious than those incurred by 
dumping arain in the ocean or burning it, so the more costly method 111ay be 
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more politically palatable. In some circumstances a method of removal of 
product more acceptable to self-interested domestic producers may be foreign 
'aid', especially if the recipients are effectively segregated from 
commercial markets. Such aid may be far more efficient as a means of 
domestic transfer to producers than a floor price scheme, even if any 
benefit to the recipients is entirely ianored • 
. Results for the other specifications offered in the literature, with 
the same consumer demand curve and initial availability, are also shown in 
Figure 3. The inclusion of private storage in the aodel is dramatically 
vindicated by comparing curve OA with curve OF, which holds private storage 
at zero. The curve OF would lead to two wrona inferences about price 
floors. First, without private storage, a floor price scheme with the floor 
levels shown appears more (incrementally) efficient than a lump sum transfer 
(represented by the diagonal OC) because it is a good substitute for the 
absent, and socially valuable, private storage. Second, it would appear 
producers would never gain from such a scheme, with this demand 
specification. The importance of recognizing dynamics is emphasized by 
curve 0G which shows the comparative statics results of a floor price scheme 
with private storage. From them it would appear consumers Jain and producers 
lose over the whole range of price floors whereas the true incidence 
combinations cover any of three quadrants, as shown by curve OA. A further 
erroneous inference from the comparative statics measure is that a low price 
floor could increase net social welfare, since the deadweight loss, measured 
by the distance from OC, appears to be negative. This apparent social gain 
reflects the fact that the cost of the expected accumulation to the 
stochastic iteady state is ianored. The only cost of stocks considered in 
the comparative statics is the current physical storage costs k. 
· If, as specified in equation (6), the disturbance acts as a shifter of 
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market demand, then the surplus transformation curve is OB. Clearly a high 
floor price is very inefficient, in terms of the interests of all 
participants within the market considered, and can decrease both expected 
consUJDer welfare and producer wealth. The reason for this is easy to 
understand. The market demand shifter is excess foreign demand, which is by 
aaswnption unresponsive to price and has a mean of zero. The domestic 
market &ains by selling in times of positive excess demand, and buying, at a 
lower price, at times .of positive excess supply. Stabilization of price 
reduces this ar.bitra1e advanta1e, and favors the country that is the source 
11 
of excess demand (whose welfare is not taken into account here.) 
One would rightly suspect. from consideration of the comparative 
statics propositions in Section 2, that the demand curve parameter C would 
be crucial in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows the surplus transformation curves 
when the consumption demand curve is linear (C=O). Here the direction of 
the distributional results is generally in favor of producers. Curve OA 
shows the surplus transformation achieved by a price floor scheme introduced 
when A0 is once again equal to 12()11, of qN. 
Curve OB shows the.surplus transformation when there is an exogenous 
disturbance in demand. Once again the transfer at high floor levels is very 
inefficient from a domestic viewpoint, since the 'foreign' participant 
gains from the stabilization scheme. On the other hand destruction, shown 
by curve OE. is less efficient relative to the floor price scheme (OA). 
Recent policy choices (for example the United States PIK program) 
indicate that the public sector may be more concerned with budget costs than 
with welfare. Fi1ure S compares the wealth transferred to producers, 1ross 
of budget costs, to the present value of the budgetary expenditures under a 
selection of programs. Curve AA, which represents the standard case (ri° = 
-0.2. C=6) for initial availability of 120IJ, of qN shows that deficiency 
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payments dominate in transfer per bud1et dollar. Curve RB shows that if 
there is an exo1enous foreign disturbance in market demand, a price floor 
scheme is inefficient in converting budget resources into producer wealth. 
Thia is not true in the same circumstances if demand is linear (C ~ 0), as 
shown by curve JJ. Linear demand implies hi1her bud1et efficiency if the 
disturbance is in supply, as shown by curve ll, and hiaher levels of 
transfer are achieved more efficiently by the floor price scheme than by 
deficiency payments. All of ·these results are in line with those of 
Figures 3 and 4. But the case of destruction or extra-aarket disposal is 
different. For the standard case, curve OE shows that producers gain far 
■ore per unit espendi ture under this policy than undet· price floors or 
deficiency payments, and this is also true in the linear case (curve OF). 
For equivalent producer gain, the average amount purchased for destruction 
is so auch less than the average amount stored that the expected present 
value of the net costs of extra storage exceeds the cost of purchase for 
destruction. 
5. The Implications of Responsive Supply for Incidence 
Thus far in our discussion of incidence we have assumed that planned 
production his fixed and producers do not respond to changes in their 
incentive Pr. In the comparative statics analysis reported in Table 1, the 
effect of such responsiveness is very predictable--it reduces the bias in 
the 'redistribution' caused by the price floor, but it does not alter the 
1i1n of the bias. 
In the comparative dynamic analysis, the interaction is aore complex. 
As discussed in Wri&ht and Williams (1982a), responsive supply complements 
private storage in stabilizing the market after a shock. If there is a 
shortaae, planned supply expands and raises expected production in the next 
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year. If there is a alut, the opposite happens. The implications for 
incidence in our standard case are shown in Fiaure 6 for a floor price 
increased to maintain a constant expected net present value of expenditures. 
Yhen supply elasticity ~sis between 0.02 and 0.39, the introduction of 
this floor when A0 is 12011i of qN increases net wealth of current producers, 
even if they pay the costs of the scheme, by reducina the fall in their land 
value more than it reduces the aain on initial stocks. The extra storage 
incurred by the initial defense ~f the floor is exp~cted to be held for such 
, a long period before resale that the earlier income-boosting effect 
outweiahs the greater. but l!llch later, income-reducing effect of resale. 
But supply response, if non-negligible, will greatly reduce the expected 
duration of this prior boost in storage, because the present value of the 
income-reducing resale becomes more significant. 
Figure 6 shows that, contrary to the comparaiive statics analysis, 
responsive supply can reverse the incidence of price floors. The reversal 
is more dramatic if producers do not own all the initial stocks, or if 
initial availability A0 is lower at the time of the introduction of the 
price floor policy. In both cases initial producers tend to fare worse at 
any supply elasticity than shown in Figure 6, and they may even suffer a net 
loss of wealth under elastic supply. If demand is linear, on the other hand, 
the redistribution towards producers shown in Figure 4 is reduced, but not 
reversed, by elastic supply. 
A plausible extrapolation from the ~tandard deterministic model miaht 
lead one to believe that a hiaher supply elasticity would lead to greater 
averaae production, and excess burden, at a hiaher price floor. But Figure 
6 shows that, in fact, the present value of the excess burden decreases with 
supply elasticity at a given expenditure level before rising again at higher 
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elasticities. The presence of supply response itself makes the effect of a 
floor less important, and the prospect of resale of stocks dampens supply 
expansion. As it happens in the case illustrated in Figure 6, mean long-run 
ssupply in the comparative statics sense decreases 0.19' at~ c 1. Under 
deficiency payinents, on the other hand, long-run supply response is 
positive, in line with conventional intuition. 
6. Stabilization and Risk Aversion 
What are the implications of risk aversion for the effects of producer 
price supports? The answer depends very much on the way the proble~ is 
modeled. If producers are risk averse over current farm income, if they 
cannot save at all, and if their utility functions are intertemporally 
separable, then it is clear that, ceteris paribus, they gain from income 
stability. Although achievement of completely stable consumption and price 
would destabilize income from random production, in most realistic cases, 
with inelastic consumption demand, price supports will stabilize producer 
income. But what happens to its mean? Just and Ballam (1978) present a 
aodel in which a firm respond positively to the aean and negatively to the 
variance of price which is assumed to be exogenous. A reductjon in price 
variance causes an outward shift in the supply curve which, they claim, 
increases the benefits to producers of stabilization. In the context of a 
co-odity aarlet with inelastic aarlet demand, the result is quite 
different. The outward shift in supply caused by the a1gre1ated responses 
of risk-averse firms will aean that greater certainty of output will be 
accoapanied by lower expected revenues. Consequently, it is by no means 
obvious that the presence of risk aversion on the part of producers 
increases their welfare 1ain from stabilization. 
In our aodel the existence of a floor price scheme increases the 
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correlation of income between periods. As Gelb (1979) has emphasized, much 
of the variation is shifted into the lower frequencies. Jt appear& to us to 
be very likely that producers would in fact be ■ ore averse to a low income 
reali1ation if it follows one or ■ore similarly low realizations. That is, 
the utility function is likely to violate the additivity assUJDption. The 
reason that this possibility is excluded from much risk analysis is not that 
it is unrealistic, but rather that it violates the axioms of Von 
NeUJ11an-N:orgenstern utility theory. (For more on this see Pollack (1967).) 
If utility is not intertemporally separable, the low-frequency fluctuations 
induced by a price floor could adversely affect producers. 
It seems more reasonable. however. to relax the no-saving assumption, 
and model utility as a function of wealth rather than of net income. A 
deeper analysis must address the determination of land price in a market of 
risk-averse participants. and define the set of assets available for the 
producer's portfolio. These tasks will not be pursued here, But we 
conjecture that two general incidence conclusions continue to be valid: (l) 
the welfare effects on producers are capitalized and borne by current asset 
holders at the time of the policy change, and (2) these effects are more 
favorable to these landholders than indicated by the previous comparative 
statics analyses. 
7. Conclusions 
Floor price schemes and deficiency payments have quite different 
implications for market participants. If a floor price is set at a level 
below the free-market mean, the scheme will reduce the mean price in the 
long run for the usual convex demand curve. If the curvature of consumption 
demand (parameter C) is sufficiently high a price floor also reduces 
producer income and raises consumer surplus in the steady state. But the 
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incidence effects under this condition depend on the level of the floor and 
the source of the market disturbance. A sufficiently hi&h floor can 
substantially increase producer wealth (land plus co1DJ11odity stocks) theat 
ti111e of introduction, because the income-boosting effect of the early 
aoc111111lation of public stocks dominates the ne1ative Iona-run effects. 
htra-aartet disposal is aore efficient than a buffer stock as a means of 
achievina a aiven transfer to curent holders of land and co1DJDodity stoc16 
via a price floor. 
.
But if the curva_ture of c-onsump•ticfn demand ·ts sufficiently low, a 
floor price scheme using a buffer stock will increase- the weal th of those 
holding land and colllJilodity stocks at the time of the (unanticipated) 
introduction of the scheme by more than the cost of its administration. 
This result is true for any effective floor below the mean price, and is 
consistent with the long run effect on producer incomes. At least for 
moderate levels of transfer, the floor price scheme supported by a buffer 
stock is more efficient than enforcement through e:1:tra""111arket disposal of 
the commodity, in contrast to cases with greater consumption demand 
curvature. The buffer stock scheme could be profitable as a private venture 
organized by an association of producers, even if it could not control 
output of the members. 
A lower floor, or more elastic supply response, tends to reduce the 
positive dynamic effect on wealth and to favor consumers. A floor price 
scheme can also appear much more favorable to consumers. and less expensive, 
if private 1tora1e is ianored. Indeed, the standard analytical approach 
which neglects dynamic effects and private storage can so areatly bias 
results towards conswners that inferences about incidence effects can easily 
be reversed. 
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If the market di~turbancc is an exo&enous shift in forei&n excess 
demand, a floor price scheme with a buffer stock favors the source of 
instability at the. expense of the domestic economy as a whole. From the 
domestic vie,rpoint, deficiency payments schemes are more efficient means of 
increasina wealth of current producers in this situation, provided that the 
welfare cost of budaet finance is sufficiently low. But if supply is 
elastic, deficiency payments destabilize consumption by reducin& the 
efficiency of the complementary interaction between production and storage. 
Like a price floor supported by estra-market disposal, but in contrast to a· 
buffer stock scheme, deficiency payments waste resources by inducing a 
socially escessive mean Iona-run supply response. 
All cases discussed share one. common, elementary feature. The 
incidence on producers occurs only throuah capitalization of benefits as 
one-time changes in wealth, and is a purely dynamic phenomenon. In an 
agricultural sector which has a small share of the economy, price supports 
have no potential for altering the welfare of current producers in the long 
run, so conventional comparative statics studies are inappropriate for 
addressing the incidence question. 
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FOO!NOTES 
•This research was supported by the National Science Foundation 
uder grant no. SES8309634. 
2For the implications of relaxing this assumption see Wright (1984). 
3Tbis is done implicitly in Wright and Williams (1984a). in wliich 
Figure V compares a market stabilized by private storage with an 
unstabiliz.ed market. In that case steady state producer revenues increase 
only if C is less than about 1.5. For l .S < C < 2, increased revenues are 
offset by costs of the storage. In the case of price floors, numerical 
results show that the expected steady state change in Sc is negative. 
4 If the supply disturbance is additive and refers to domestic 
production, responsive supply may mean Jess production and even greater 
gains in producer revenue, at the expense of consumers, than indicated in 
Propositions 3 and 5. By Proposition 3b, income of producers as a whole 
increases if C < 2 - I. Bere the marginal incentive is the expected price, 
which by Proposition 4 falls for C > 0. Production contracts, increasing 
the producer income gains. More generally, aggregate supply responsiveness 
aay favor producers as a group if their supply behavior is heterogeneous. 
5 ny assume risk neutrality on the part of private storers? The 
evidence indicates that any risk associated with co111J11odity storage is 
eminently diversifiable (see Dusak (1973)), the co111JDents of Carter, Rausser 
and Schmitz. (1983), and the response of Marcus (1984)). Consistent with 
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this !indina, empirical estimates find 'risk premia' in storage markets to 
be so small as to be difficult to detect at all. 
6 ny competitive stortge7 First, barriers to entry are insianificant. 
Second, monopolists would wish to store less than competitors in all 'states 
of the world' if they monopolize only storage (Wriaht and Williams 1984b), 
so free entry would drive them out. If a monopolist also controls 
production, Newbery (1984) has shown that the monopolist may store more than 
would a competitive market if demand is linear and price elastic in the 
relevant range. Thus the monopolist could drive out competitive storage. 
But here we are concerned with commodity markets in which cons11J11ption demand 
is almost invariably price inelastic. (If it is not, the role of storage 
tends to be negligible in models like ours. See Wright and Williams 
(1982a).) 
7Previous investigations (Wright and Williams 1982a) have shown that 
the symmetry of the distribution ,;an be important, but that a distribution 
1ike the one presented here &ives results very similar to those for other 
compact symmetric distributions with the same variance, such as an 80 point 
discrete appro~imation to the normal distribution. Evidence on skewness of 
yields is sparse, and ambiauous with respect to the direction of skew. 
Bence we opt for symmetry as the best aanostic position. 
8 •Land' is for simplicity defined here to include all fixed factors 
used in production of the commodity. Land is assllllled to be owned by 
producers. 
9nis ass1llllption is consistent with a aeneral equilibrium 
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overlapping aenerations model with bequests (Calvo, (otlikoff and Rodriquez 
(1979)). But if there are no bequests, the dynamic path of land price to 
the new steady state may not involve full Ricardian capitalization. Jn fact, 
in an overlapping aeneration context, under reasonable assuiptions, full 
capitalization appears to be a limiting case. These dynamic aeneral 
equilibrium issues have been investiaated elsewhere in a non".'"stochastic 
context (Chamley and lri&ht 1983). Bere we confine ourselves to the simpler 
Ricardian approach. 
10
Recent estimates of the mar&inal welfare cost of public finance 
(Stuart 1984 Table 2) tend to lie in the region 0.2 to 0.3. but for 
plausible parameterizations may wel 1 exceed 0.40. If we took this into 
account it is conceivable that the price floor scheme could involve a lower 
deadweight loss than an alternative deficiency payments scheme, especially 
if the commodity is, from an efficiency viewpoint, 'under-taxed' in the 
current fiscal structure. 
11Indeed. if foreign (stochastic) excess demand were globally 
completely inelastic, then the optimal policy from the rational viewpoint 
would be to pay a price of zero to the foreign supplier when buying, and 
charae an infinite price when selling, a policy which amounts to a radical 
destabilization of border price. An interesting comparative statics model 
of aarket stabilization in an open economy is found in Tyers (1983). 
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Table 1 
Comparative Statics Effects of Price Support Schemes 8 
Consumer Consumer Producer Government 
Price Consumption ~urplp.s Sp.rplus 
Expenditure 
1. Ref iciencI Pa?J!ent Scheme 
1.1. 11S :::: 0 0 0 0 + + 
(0) (0) (0) (-) ( +) 
+ ➔ 
( +) (+) (+) ( +) ( +) 
1.2. "s > o + + 
2. Floor Price Scheme 
A. Multiplicative Production 
Disturbance Shared by All 
Producers: 
2.1. 118 == 0 Sgn(C) 0 Sgn(C-1) Sgn (2-C-K) + 
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-) 
2.2. 11S > 0 Sgn(C) Sgn(2-C-K) ? Sgn(2-C-K) + 
(-) (-) (-) (-) ( +) 
B. Stochastic Export Demand, 
Kean Zero: 
2.3. 11S:: 0 Sgn(C) 0 San(C-1) Sgn(C) + 
(-) (-) (-) (-) ( +) 
2.4 118 > 0 Sgn(C) ? Sgn(C) + 
(-) (-) (-) (-) ( +) 
asians of the directions of changes of means, and, in parentheses, standard 
4eviations, are shown in the table. C ~ -q(B2P/Bq2 )/(8P/Bq) and K is a function of 
the chanae in private storage costs, as described in the text. 
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